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Nevertheless, a liberal interpretation of the instant case reveals the ambit
to be expandable enough to require adequate treatment for dangerous as well
as nondangerous mental patients. As a class action, the Wyatt court was presented with a range of divergent personalities, ostensibly including dangerous
individuals, who were all constitutionally entitled to treatment. Although
vague, a similar interpretation by the principal court seems to be indicated. 55
Taken otherwise, societal attitudes concerning rehabilitation of individuals
mentally unable to initiate self-care processes are effectively ignored. Recognition of the mentally ill as sick, not criminal, has finally occurred and should
be judicially reflected.
In light of this inherent ambiguity, clarification is essential. Nevertheless,
a higher court need not confine itself to clarification. The mentally ill have
too long occupied a status inferior to classifications based on race, color, creed,
and sex, which now enjoy at least minimal commands of due process. The
opportunity exists to tread where the principal court dared not and guarantee
the full panoply of constitutional protections to the mentally ill.
Scow" L. WHiTAKER

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ANOTHER LIMITATION ON
THE MANDATE OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA AND
FURTHER EROSION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Michigan v. Tucker, 94 S. Ct. 2359 (1974)
On April 19, 1966, respondent was arrested, charged with rape, and subjected to police custodial interrogation. Prior to being questioned, respondent
was advised that he had the right to remain silent, that any statements he
made could be used against him, and that he had a right to consult an attorney. The police officers, conducting the interrogation prior to the date of
the United State Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona' did not
advise respondent, an indigent, 2 of his right to appointed counsel. During the
course of the interrogation, respondent told police that at the time of the crime
he was elsewhere in the company of his friend, Henderson. The police located
Henderson who, rather than corroborating the alibi, offered information discrediting respondent's story. Prior to trial, respondent moved to exclude Henderson's testimony on the ground that the failure of police to advise respondent of the right to appointed counsel constituted an incomplete recital
55. 493 F.2d at 518-27.
1.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2. "Respondent is an indigent who has been respresented at all times in both state and
federal courts by court appointed counsel .
Michigan v. Tucker, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2373
(1974). (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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of the warnings that the intervening Miranda opinion had held were due all
criminal defendants. 3 The trial court denied the motion, Henderson testified,
and respondent was convicted. Respondent applied for writ of habeas corpus
in the United States district court. The district court granted the writ on the
basis of the Miranda violation, 4 and the court of appeals affirmed the lower
court's holding.5 On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD, the failure of police to adhere to "prophylactic rules" of
the Court, absent a willful or negligent violation of such rules, is not sufficient
grounds for the exclusion of fruits of a statement that is itself made inadmissible by the mandate of the Mirandadecision.
The fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has
its roots in early efforts to prevent a recurrence of the evils associated with
inquisitions and the Star Chamber.6 Courts imposed constitutional sanctions
upon police custodial interrogations, first from a concern for the lack of
trustworthiness inherent in forced confessions, but later with the concept that
involuntary confessions are offensive to notions of due process. 7 The development of standards for the determination of voluntariness of confessions resulting from custodial interrogations was begun by the Supreme Court in the
1936 case of Brown v. Mississippi." The latest articulation of such standards
is set forth in the 1966 opinion of the Court in Miranda v. Arizona9
The Miranda Court, in an express attempt to clarify a previous decision

3. 384 U.S. at 479. The Miranda Court said: "He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in
a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires."
Id. (emphasis added).
4. Tucker v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
5. Tucker v. Johnson, 480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1973).
6. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956). The Ullmann Court cites Dean
Wigmore, who states that the movement toward creation of the privilege began in England
-with opposition to the ex officio oath of the eccelsiastical courts and the incriminating question in the common law courts, culminating with the abolishment of the ex officio oath and
the court of Star Chamber in 1641. Dean Wigmore, however, points out that the privilege
against self-incrimination was unrecognized in the colonies until at least as late as 1685.
Thus, the colonies, having had their own experience with "highhanded prerogative courts,"
developed the privilege in their own history. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVDENCE §2260 (McNaughton
rev. 1961).
7. The judicial approach to confessions developed in stages from an early common law
approach of no restriction on their admissibility to a concern for the trustworthiness of
confessions, and finally to the due process tests developed by the United States Supreme
Court in the 1900's. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6. See also Note, Developments in the Law Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REy. 935 (1966).
8. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Brown the Court found that the confessions of the defendants
were extorted by flagrant physical abuse and by threats of further violence. In reversing the
conviction, the Brown Court held that the use of confessions obtained by violence as the
sole means of obtaining a conviction was offensive to due process. Id. at 286.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For a chronological history of the development of voluntariness
standards after Brown, see Comment, An Analysis of the Procedures Used To Determine the
Voluntariness of Confessions: And a Solution, 11 S.D.L. Riv. 70-72 (1966).
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dealing with voluntariness standards, 10 promulgated the so-called Miranda
warnings.1 In order to minimize what was termed the inherent coerciveness
of police custodial interrogation, 12 the Miranda Court required, as a prerequisite to admissibility of any statements made by a defendant to police, that
the prescribed warnings be issued and a waiver of constitutional rights obtained prior to any questioning. 13
The Court anticipated the impact of Miranda on the administration of
criminal law; one week after that decision was announced the Court handed
14
down its opinion in Johnson v. New Jersey limiting the retroactivity of
Miranda sanctions. The Johnson Court, pointing to protections offered by
15
prior decisions relating to the admissibility of confessions, limited the ap13, 1966.16 Thus, the
plicability of Miranda to trials that began after June
7
case.'
instant
the
to
applicable
was
decision
Miranda
10. 384 U.S. at 440. The Miranda Court, referring to Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), stated: "This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal
debate since it was decided two years ago ....

We granted certiorari in these cases . . . in

order further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege
against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." Id. at 440-42 (citations
omitted).
11. 384 U.S. at 479. See note 3 supra.
12. The Court stated: "The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds
with one of our nation's most cherished principles - that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant
can truly be the product of his free choice." 384 U.S. at 457, 458 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 479.
14. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
15. Id. at 730. In stating that their previous case law was available to persons whose
trials were completed prior to Escobedo and Miranda, the Johnson Court cited its 1963 decision of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963) (federal habeas corpus relief available to
prisoner for review of state conviction based upon alleged constitutional violation despite
prisoner's failure to pursue a state remedy of appeal on grounds not available during the
time for such appeal). After mentioning the availability of federal court review of preMiranda convictions, the Johnson Court pointed to the existence of voluntariness standards
developed prior to 1966, which were applicable to such cases. 384 U.S. 730 See, e.g., Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 479 (1964) (where suspect is denied his request to consult with attorney
prior to questioning and is not informed of his right to remain silent, his subsequent statements are taken in violation of the sixth amendment and are inadmissible); Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (allowing admissibility of defendant's statements to police to be
based on a decision by the jury as to voluntariness held offensive to due process); Rogers v.
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (the test for admissibility of confessions is not based upon
the probable truth or falsity of statements but whether such confession is freely and voluntarily given); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (the aim of due process is to
prevent fundamental unfairness in the admissibility of evidence, whether true or false).
16. 384 U.S. at 734. The Johnson Court was not persuaded that the holding in Escobedo
anticipated the standards later announced in Miranda, and reasoned that to upset all preMiranda convictions then on appeal would impose an "unjustifiable burden on the administration of justice." Id. at 733.
17. Although the defendant was questioned on April 19, 1966, his trial began on October
18, 1966, after the date of the Miranda decision. People v. Tucker, 19 Mich. App. 320-25
(1969).
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There is language in the Miranda decision indicating that the Court intended the exclusionary provisions to apply to all evidence obtained pursuant
to an interrogation conducted without benefit of the required warnings.' s
Nevertheless, lower courts have expressed doubts concerning the extension of
Miranda sanctions to fruits of an inadmissible statement, specifically with
respect to the testimonial evidence of an independent witness. 9 The trial
court in the instant case reflected this doubt. While recognizing that the
Johnson decision made Miranda applicable so as to mandate suppression of
respondent's statement to police as evidence at trial,2 0 the court refused to
exclude the testimony of Henderson, whose identity was obtained solely
2
through respondent's statements. 1
In granting respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis
of the Miranda violation, the district court did not rely exclusively on the
provisions of that holding, but on a two-step constitutional theory. First, the
court stated that the failure of police to complete the required Miranda
warnings resulted in a direct infringement of respondent's fifth amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 2 2 The court then applied an
extension of the doctrine articulated in the 1963 Supreme Court decision in
Wong Sun v. United States,23 holding, that Henderson's testimonial evidence,
obtained pursuant to a violation of the fifth amendment, was "fruit of the
poisonous tree" 24 and therefore inadmissible at trial. In applying the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to a fifth amendment
violation involving third-party testimony, .the district court implicitly recognized that it was extending the Wong Sun rationale.26 The Wong Sun Court
18. The Miranda Court stated: "But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
can be used against him." 384 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added).
19. See, e.g., People v. Peacock, 29 App. Div. 2d 762, 287 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1968), wherein
the court said that a defendant's statements taken in violation of Miranda were inadmissible
at his subsequent trial and further stated that if the court was convinced the testimony of
the victim had been gained solely through defendant's inadmissible statements, the court
would have excluded such testimony. Contra, People v. Dannic, 30 App. Div. 2d 679, 292
N.Y.S.2d 257 (1968). In this subsequent decision, the same court that decided Peacock stated:
"A bare finding that the identity of witnesses was learned by illegal means is insufficient to
warrant exclusion ...."Id. at 680, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
20. 19 Mich. App. at 325.
21. Id. at 330-31.
22. Tucker v.- Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1972). The district court framed
the following question: "[D]oes the introduction by the prosecution in its case in chief of
testimony of a third person which is admittedly the fruit of an illegally obtained statement
by the petitioner, violate petitioner's Fifth Amendment rights? Reluctantly, we hold that it
does and that, therefore, the writ must be granted." Id. at 268.
23. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
24. The phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree" was first used by the Supreme Court in
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). The doctrine was expanded to include verbal
evidence in Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485. For a detailed discussion of the application of the
Wong Sun doctrine by lower courts, see Note, Criminal Procedure-Fourth Amendment
*Vitality of Wong Sun, 19 Rrrms L. Rzv. 140 (1964).
25. 352 F. Supp. at 268. See note 22 supra.
26. 352 F. Supp. at 269. In approaching the issue of applying Wong Sun to non-defendant
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had applied exclusionary provisions to verbal evidence obtained from a defendant as a result of a fourth amendment violation.27 In 1967 the Supreme
Court extended the exclusionary rule to sixth amendment violations; 28 in a
footnote comment in a later case, however, the Court specifically declined to
reach the issue of admissibility of witness testimony alleged to be a product of
29
the poisonous tree.
In holding that the failure of the trial court to exclude the disputed testimony in the instant case was prejudicial error, the district court reasoned that,
since evidence obtained in violation of the fourth and sixth amendments was
inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree, no valid distinction existed calling
for a different treatment of evidence tainted by a violation of the equally important fifth amendment. 30 With the issues thus framed by the lower courts,
the Supreme Court approached the instant case for decision.
Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated initially that respondent, while complaining of the failure of police to advise him of his right
to appointed counsel, had not based his challenge to the admissibility of
Henderson's testimony on the sixth amendment guarantee of right to counsel.31
Thus, the Supreme Court narrowed the issue to the questions of whether the
police, by failing to comply fully with Miranda warnings, had directly infringed respondent's constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination
2
and whether evidence thus obtained should have been excluded at his trial.3
In considering this issue, the Court first noted that, historically, whenever
there had been evidence of genuine compulsion, the fifth amendment had been
testimony, the court said: "Of course, the statements excluded in Wong Sun and Harrison
were those of defendants whose rights were violated. But in Wade and Gilbert the testimony
excluded was that of third persons. Thus the fact that a third person's testimony as opposed to petitioner's testimony is at issue is not significant. The testimony is no less the
result of the illegal interrogation merely because it was made by a third party." Id. For
further discussion of above mentioned cases, see notes 28, 29 infra.
27. 371 U.S. at 471, 485.
28. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). In Wade the Court held that a police
lineup for the purpose of witness identification of criminal suspects was a critical stage of
criminal prosecution. Therefore, the Court reasoned, defendant had a right to be represented
by counsel at such a lineup where defendant's participation was compelled. Id. at 236, 237.
Thus, the Wade Court held that where counsel is not present at such lineup (absent defendant's intelligent waiver of sixth amendment rights), courtroom identification of defendant
by witnesses who participated in the lineup are excluded unless such identifications are based
upon observation of the suspect other than in the lineup. Id. at 240. Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1969), was a companion case to Wade and decided on similar grounds.
29. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 223 n.9 (1968). In Harrison the defendant
testified at his original trial in an effort to overcome the introduction of incriminating statements made by him to police. His conviction was reversed based upon a finding that the
statements introduced were illegally obtained. Id. at 220. The Harrison Court held that defendant's testimony at the original trial was inadmissible at his second trial in that he was
induced to testify because of the introduction of illegally obtained statements. Id. at 223.
30. 352 F. Supp. at 269.
31. 94 S. Ct. at 2360. The present majority, noting the failure of respondent to allege a
sixth amendment violation, distinguished the instant case from the rationale of United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Id. at 2361. See note 27 supra.
32. 94 S. Ct. at 2361.
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given broad scope. 33 The Court pointed out, however, that police in the instant case, by advising respondent of his rights to remain silent and to consult with an attorney, and by telling him that any statements he made could
be used against him had complied in full with existing pre-Miranda voluntariness tests. Consequently, the Court found no compulsion in the instant
interrogation.34
Next, the Court proceeded to define the constitutional status of the
Miranda principles. Terming Miranda provisions "prophylactic standards"
developed by the Court in order to protect the fifth amendment rights of
criminal defendants, the Court held the required warnings to be procedural
safeguards that were not themselves guaranteed by the Constitution. 5 The
Court was quick to note, however, that defining the Miranda requirements as
prophylactic rules did not mean that a deviation from those rules was without
consequence. The Court pointed out that respondent's statements to police
had been excluded at trial.3 6
Because respondent's statement was not obtained by compulsion, the Court
concluded that the police interrogation in the instant case was not the kind
of evil that the fifth amendment seeks to eliminate.3 7 This determination,
coupled with the Court's definition of Miranda requirements as prophylactic
rules, as opposed to constitutional standards, enabled the Court to conclude
that the interrogation of respondent absent the complete Miranda warnings
33. Id. at 2362. The Court noted that while the constitutional language of the fifth
amendment might indicate that the privilege against self-incrimination was intended to
apply only to situations where the defendant is called to testify at his criminal trial, the
application of the privilege has been held by the Court to include numerous other circumstances. Id. See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). The Court in Counselman
stated that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be given a broad
construction in favor of the right that it was intended to secure, and held the privilege
available to a witness at a grand jury proceeding. Id. at 562. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967) (privilege available to a juvenile in a state juvenile court proceeding); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege may be invoked by a witness at an inquiry into criminal
activity conducted pursuant to state statute); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)
(privilege may be invoked by a witness testifying before a congressional committee); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (privilege available to a bankrupt during an examination by a special commissioner in a civil proceeding). For an in-depth treatment of the
scope of the fifth amendment, see Note, Constitutional Law -Fifth Amendment: An Unwarranted Extension of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 58 Ca'.
L. REv. 988 (1970).
34. 94 S.Ct. at 2364.

35. Id. Mr.Justice Douglas, however, maintained that the Miranda warnings were constitutional standards, reasoning that the Miranda case prescribes modes of interrogation to
protect fifth amendment rights. Thus, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that, since the Court was
not free to prescribe preferred modes of interrogation without a constitutional basis, the
Miranda rules were fundamental to fifth amendment rights and a different holding would
have rendered the Court powerless to reverse Miranda's conviction. Id. at 2373 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
36. Id. at 2864. See also People v. Tucker, 19 Mich. App. 320 (1969).
37. 94 S.Ct. at 2364. The Court pointed out that the police conduct complained of in
the instant case did not involve the historical practices the fifth amendment seeks to
eliminate nor was the respondent subjected to "the cruel trilemma of self accusation, perjury,
or contempt." Id., quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
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had not itself constituted a violation of the fifth amendment. The remaining
question, then, dealt with the applicability of the poisonous tree doctrine to
the case at bar.
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court in the IVong Sun case applied the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to evidence obtained as a result
of an illegal search violating the fourth amendment. 38 The instant Court
reasoned that the Wong Sun decision was thus limited to evidence obtained as
a result of police conduct, which actually infringed upon a constitutional
right. 39 Based on its determination that the interrogation of respondent in the
instant situation involved no abridgement of a constitutional right, since the
police conduct in issue had merely been a departure from prophylactic rules
of Court, the majority distinguished Wong Sun and stated that it was not
controlling in the case at bar. Therefore, the instant Court approached the
question of admissibility of the disputed testimony as one of first impression. 40
In a portion of the opinion that is likely to receive attentive reception in
law enforcement circles, Mr. Justice Rehnquist outlined the philosophy of the
present majority pertaining to exclusionary rules in general. Noting that the
law does not guarantee a defendant a perfect trial, only a fair one, he reasoned
that the law could not reasonably expect police officers to conduct perfect investigations. 41 In fact, Mr. Justice Rehnquist said: "The pressures of law enforcement and the vagaries of human nature would make such an expectation
unrealistic. Before we penalize police error, therefore, we must consider
' 42
whether the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose."
Justice Rehnquist went on to define the purpose of the exclusionary rule
as deterrence to unlawful police action. This view of the exclusionary rule
was most recently articulated by Mr. Justice Powell, writing for a six-man
majority of the Court in United States v. Calandra,4 decided six months
prior to the instant case. In Calandra the Court, refusing to apply the exclusionary rule so as to permit a grand jury witness to refuse to answer questions based upon illegally obtained evidence, emphasized that the primary
purpose of the rule is to deter unlawful police conduct." By placing police
38. 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963).
39. 94 S. Ct. at 2364.
40. Id. at 2365.
41. Id. For a discussion of the Court's prior approach to Miranda'seffect on the judiciary,
see Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966). See also note 16 supra.
42. 94 S. Ct. at 2365.
43. 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974). The Calandra Court expressed great reluctance to apply the
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings based upon a concern that resultant suppression
hearings would cause disruption and "protracted interruption of grand jury proceedings."
Id. at 620, 631. The Court, however, pointed out that fourth and fifth amendment protections
were available to limit the grand jury's power of subpoena in order to prevent unwarranted
invasions of privacy or infringements upon the privilege against self-incrimination, or both.
Id. at 619. See also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (constitutional protection
for the grand jury witness).
44. 94 S. Ct. at 619, 620. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) ("The
rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter- to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way - by removing the incentive
to disregard it").

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 20
CASE COMMENTS

officers on notice that evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution will
not be admitted in furtherance of obtaining criminal conviction, the Court
reasoned that the incentive for police officers to disregard constitutional guidelines is removed. 45 Therefore, the Calandra majority stated that the application of the exclusionary rule would be limited to those situations where its
deterrent objectives might be served.46
Adopting the view expounded in Calandra,the instant Court reasoned that
application of the rule presupposes police action that constitutes willful (or at
least negligent) deprivation of a defendant's rights 7 Thus, the instant Court
found the existence of such conduct on the part of police to be a prerequisite
for the exclusion of evidence challenged on the basis of the exclusionary rule.48

Having implied that the exclusionary rule is imposed as a penalty for
police error,49 the Court refused to employ such punitive measures in the
instant case. The present majority said that Miranda stands for the proposi-

tion that statements of a defendant to police, elicited in violation of the
Miranda rules, may not be used by the prosecution to obtain his subsequent

conviction.50 Therefore, the Court reasoned that the trial court in the principal
case, by excluding respondent's statement, had complied fully with the mandate of Miranda.51

The instant decision may have important impact in two significant aspects
of criminal law. First, the majority opinion, read with the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice White, indicates clearly that six members of the present Court

would limit the scope of Miranda to effect only the admissibility of the words
of the defendant.2 Second, the present opinion contains strong dicta indicat-

45. 94 S. Ct. at 620. See note 44 supra.
46. 94 S. Ct. at 620. For a detailed discussion of the limitations and purposes of the
exclusionary rule as well as arguments for its restriction, see Kaplan, The Limits of the
Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REy. 1027 (1974).
47. 94 S. Ct. at 2365. This notion of restricting the application of the exclusionary rule
to situtations involving conduct, that the rule is designed to prevent, is based upon the
premise that the rule must stand or fall based upon its demonstrated effectiveness. Kaplan,
supra note 46, at 1029. In support of this position, it is argued that the rule, first adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), does
not have sufficient lineage nor constitutional basis to support its continued viability unless
ift is proved to be a valid and effective remedy. Id.
48. The present Court stated that in such situations, the deterrent rationale for imposition of the rule loses its force. 94 S. Ct. at 2365.
49. "Id. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
50. 94 S. Ct. at 2364. This limitation of Miranda to respondent's statements by the
present majority is a principal point of contention in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall. Id. at 2372 n.5 (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Brennan
pointed to the Miranda decision, which said: "[U]nless and until warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial no evidence obtained as a result of an interrogation
can be used." Id. In the concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan urged the instant case be
decided on the limitation of Miranda to direct statements of a defendant made during interrogations conducted prior to June 13, 1966. Id. at 2371.
51. 94 S. Ct. at 2364.
52. See 94 S. Ct. at 2368 n.26. In this footnote response to Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, see note 50 supra, the instant majority stated: "Johnson has never been
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ing a type of good faith test in the applicability of the exclusionary rule,53
thus diluting the rather stringent sanctions on police conduct developed by
54
prior decisions of the Court.
The approach of the instant Court in limiting the application of the exclusionary rule is further evidence of the inclination of the Court, in recent
years, toward a general weakening of the rule.55 Members of the present Court
have, in prior opinions, expressed disenchantment with the deterrent value of
the rule. 6 Thus, the present Court, in requiring that the implementation of
the poisonous tree doctrine be predicated on willful (or at least negligent)
police conduct resulting in a direct constitutional violation, is not departing
from the trend established in its recent decisions.
The present majority expressed an inclination to limit the precedent of
prior holdings to the facts in those individual cases.5 7 Such an interpretation,
if applied to the principal decision, would limit the future impact of the instant case. The present Court found significance in the facts that the challenged interrogation occured prior to the Miranda decision and that the police,
in eliciting respondent's statements, acted in good faith. The future impact of
the instant decision, and the consequent continued influence of Miranda, as
well as the validity of the exclusionary rule, will depend upon a future determination of that significance.
JAMES W. YORK

thought controlling on the question of fruits, for the simple reason that the parent Miranda
case did not reach that issue." Id. See also 94 S.Ct. at 2372 (White, J., concurring).
53. 94 S. Ct. at 2365.
54. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (protection of the exclusionary rule is
available to defendants tried in state court and exclusionary rule restrictions apply to actions
of state officers); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (knowledge
gained through illegal search and seizure may not be used as a basis to subpoena evidence
against a defendant); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (defendant is denied fourth
amendment protection where illegally obtained evidence is used against him in his criminal
trial).
55. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 46, at 1047, 1048. It is suggested that the extension of
the scope of the exclusionary rule pursuant to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), has
tended to cause the contraction of substantive rights protected by the Court. See also Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (allowing the statement of a defendant inadmissible under
Miranda to be used by the prosecution to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial).
56. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In his Bivens dissent, Chief Justice Burger launched a direct attack on the viability
of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 412-24. See also the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan.
Id. at 399.
57. 94 S. Ct. at 2368 n.26. The instant majority stated: "No defendant in Miranda sought
to block evidence of the type challenged in this case, and the holding of Miranda, even if
made fully retroactive, would not therefore resolve the question of whether Henderson's
testimony must also be excluded at trial." Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

9

